If I had become an academic--i.e., gone on for the Ph.D. and a job in research and university teaching--my career
might have have turned out like Mel Gurtov’s. Dr. Gurtov started as a researcher with the Rand Corporation--where studies deal with real world issues--and advanced to professor of political science in the University of California system. He is professor emeritus of political science at Portland State University and editor in chief of the journal Asian Perspective. He is author of more than 20 books on Asia and U.S. foreign policy.
Gurtov contributed a brilliant article on U.S.-China relations, entitled “The Uncertain Future of a ‘New Type’ of U.S.-China Relationship,” in the December 30, 2013 issue of The Asia-Pacific Journal (link here). The article also touched on the U.S.-Japan alliance and Japan-China relations. For elaboration, readers were referred to his new book, Will This Be China’s Century--A Skeptic’s View (Rienner, 2013).
After reading Gurtov’s article and his book, I find that I agree with him on almost everything. I am therefore delighted that Professor Gurtov has consented, for the benefit of Whither Japan readers, to answer questions below. Readers are invited to put additional questions to him in the form of comments.
Whither Japan Q: How do you assess the Obama administration’s “pivot” or “rebalancing” to Asia policy in terms of U.S. interests?
Gurtov A: Although the “pivot” may provide security reassurance to U.S. allies such as the Philippines, it does so at the expense of a larger (to my mind) interest in a constructive partnership with China. The “pivot” supports those in China who argue that the U.S. is once again trying to contain China, and therefore reviving what the Chinese call “Cold War thinking.” Strengthening U.S. naval and air positions in East Asia as well as security commitments to Japan, South Korea, and others may seem innocent to some. But in fact the U.S. military already has overwhelming strength in Asia relative to China, and China is in no position to catch up. Why provide arguments for accelerated Chinese military modernization while weakening the U.S. appeal for China’s support on North Korea, Iran, and climate change?
Whither Japan Q: How do you assess progress, or lack of progress, in U.S.-China relations since the Sunnylands Summit? To what extent and has Japan been a factor?
Gurtov A: The Obama-Xi summit’s success has been greatly exaggerated. A positive face has been put on small achievements. The tough questions—climate change, territorial disputes in the South China and East China seas, arms sales to Taiwan, human rights—remain major differences. Some common ground may have been found on North Korea’s nuclear weapons, but even that issue is more a matter of a changed Chinese perception of North Korea’s reliability than the result of the summit. As for Japan, my guess is that it was barely mentioned at the summit and remains out there as a very sore point of difference (see below).
Whither Japan Q: Is the U.S.-Japan alliance compatible with constructive “new type” of U.S.-China relationship? Are expanded Japanese military operations--like “collective self-defense”--likely to be a positive or negative factor going forward?
Gurtov A: China-Japan relations are at a dangerously low point, much worse than in, say, 2005 because of the very real possibility of a clash at sea. The U.S. position on the territorial issue is hardly neutral, since it is vested in the security alliance. Now that the U.S., which has for many years pressed Japan to bear a heavier security burden in Asia, has a nationalistic Japanese leader who is committed to constitutional revision and a larger, more active military, the alliance has a specifically anti-China look that is obviously incompatible with a “new type” of U.S.-China relationship. Prime Minister Abe may talk about engaging China, but all the signals from Tokyo suggest disengagement. It also doesn’t help matters that Abe’s positions have embittered Japan’s relations with South Korea, further undermining regional stability and discomfiting the U.S. “pivot.”
Whither Japan Q: Do you believe that the Senkaku/Diaoyu island dispute deadlock can be resolved? What would be the consequences? Can you offer some idea for its resolution?
Gurtov A: The territorial issue is deeply enmeshed in the overall negative state of China-Japan relations. I can’t imagine that it can be resolved—or, more likely, shelved—without prior improvement in the relationship as a whole. That probably means a summit meeting. Abe needs to stop pushing the envelope of Japanese military expansion if he is to convince Beijing that diplomacy is worthwhile. Otherwise, as mentioned, I fear that a firefight will occur, with escalation always a possibility. Once the two sides lower their hostile rhetoric and start to engage diplomatically, it should be possible to deal with the territorial question either by a code of conduct to prevent military activity in the Senkaku/Diaoyudao area or by a sharing of resources there.
Whither Japan Q: What position and future role in Asia and the world do you think is the best for Japan and the Japanese people? Will change by the United States be necessary for Japan to realize this future?
Gurtov A: I have long believed that the most important contributions Japan can make to Asia and the world are as a “global civilian power,” the phrase used by Funabashi Yoichi in the early 1990s. That means taking advantage of Japan’s technological and financial strengths to become a leader in Third World development assistance. Japan can also play greater roles in UN peacekeeping operations, disaster relief, and construction of a security dialogue mechanism for Northeast Asia. Lastly, Japan has to adopt a good neighbor policy focused on improving relations with Korea and China, as Prime Minister Obuchi called for some 14 years ago. For the U.S., a new Japanese mission that rejects “normal nation” militarization may be hard to accept, since it will ultimately require that the military presence in Japan wind down and the security obligation to Japan become more distant. But all this is a small price to pay for a more pacific Asia, especially with regard to China’s view of Japan and China-U.S. relations.
Whither Japan: Thank you Dr. Gurtov
