The Obama Administration announced on March 31 that it was reinstating $1.5 billion in military aid to the al-Sisi regime in Egypt. But the State Department has failed to review the aid.
Aid to Egypt is a no-brainer, right? With the government takeover by the military under Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in July 2013, Egypt is again our ideological ally. And, with militants on the warpath in Yemen, Libya and Sinai, we need a strong Egyptian military, right?
But there is a big unanswered question: how, and what for, and just how wisely, will the United States provide the $1.5 billion annually? Little-noticed March reports by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and Congressional Research Service (CRS) shed a disconcerting light on how the State Department gives security aid to Egypt.
First, elsewhere, the State Department has a policy of evaluating large projects, or at least tries to have such a policy. And, State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, which manages security aid, identified Egyptian military aid two years ago as needing evaluation. To say that Egyptian aid needs evaluation is an understatement. Egypt is the second largest recipient of military aid. In fact, Egypt receives about 20 percent of all U.S. funding provided to foreign countries through the Foreign Military Funding program.
So, having belatedly noticed this two years ago, did State finish an evaluation of Egypt, or even start one? No. State depends upon contractors to do the evaluating. It has a standing contract with a bunch of contractors to do it (for contracting aficionados, the type is multiple award task order). State formally asked the contractors on that contract to bid on the task order of evaluating the Egyptian military aid. But, not a single one offered any bid at all to take on the project.
So it has not been done or even started. What got in the way? GAO notes "neither State nor DOD has established performance metrics, nor has either agency consistently collected performance data on the FMF program." No metrics and no data?
Sounds like State and DoD are running a loose ship, to avoid the friction with foreign countries of evaluation, metrics, or data.
Another reason, says GAO: "a foreign military such as the Egyptian Armed Forces might be reluctant to cooperate on an evaluation of military capabilities, as it might be perceived as intelligence gathering." Really? Even if it were a high priority for the U.S. before giving $1.5 billion in aid?
Translation: getting the information on Egypt's use of the $1.5 billion in aid is State's lowest priority. For the Egyptian military, keeping quiet Egypt's military's flaws and mistakes -- conceivably even corruption -- may well be the highest priority. Negative evaluations might get out to critics of the regime.
Oh, but maybe not enough credit is being given to the national security agencies for closely reviewing the situation. When National Security Council Spokesperson Bernadette Meehan announced the reinstatement of aid, she reassured that "Following the events of August 2013 [al-Sisi's takeover], President Obama ordered a comprehensive review of our security assistance" and "the President's national security team carefully examined our military assistance relationship with Egypt." Ms. Meehan did announce a couple of reforms.
However, the main point of the review concerned the problem of Egyptian human rights and political reform and regional considerations. This was not focused on the kind of nitty-gritty of aid evaluation. Second, what concretely might come out of evaluating?
As GAO said, "little is known about the effectiveness of past assistance [to Egypt] toward achieving U.S. strategic goals." And, "the absence of an evaluation of security assistance to Egypt raises questions about how this program -- supported by $1.3 billion in U.S. funding annually -- is contributing to meeting strategic objectives and what levels of funding are needed for success." The immediate weapon deliveries approved by the White House consisted of 12 F-16 aircraft, 20 Harpoon missiles, and up to 125 M1a1 Abrams tank kits.
Suppose the Egyptian army considers going into Yemen or Libya. And it faces the prospect, as the American army did in Iraq, that after a "mission accomplished" fighting with any organized military, it may face an insurgency. Will indiscriminate use of American-sold planes and tanks lead to the kinds of civilian casualties that inflame an insurgency? Is the American aid building up the other kinds of equipment and vehicles needed to support dispersed fights on land, besides tanks -- like the up-armored Humvees the United States needed in Iraq? Is the aid building up logistics support, including spare parts and repair capability, for a long fight?
A last point is the unmentioned beneficiaries of keeping the un-evaluated program focused on high-priced weapons: American makers of these weapons. The terms of this foreign military aid specify that American arms get purchased, through the American Department of Defense. Those are Lockheed Martin planes, General Dynamics tanks, and Boeing missiles. It happens to work in those firms' interests that there not be too much evaluation of military aid that might question whether so much money should go to these weapons.
